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Abstract 
Efficient and reliable power sector is a veritable channel for economic growth. Even with abundant electricity 
production sources, Nigeria’s electricity production and distribution systems are technically weak. However, 
efforts such as the recent commercialization and privatization of the power sector have been made to solve these 
problems without significant success. Electricity supply processes may be affected by institutional quality. There 
are indications that institutional quality in Nigeria is weak and inefficient and this may affect supply of 
electricity in the country. Hence, this study examines the impact of institutional quality on electricity supply in 
Nigeria. Based on the Neoclassical Solow-Swan growth model, the study adopted the standard econometric error 
correction mechanism (ECM) and used time series data from 1981 to 2015. The ADF tests showed that all the 
variables were stationary and statistically significant and integrated of order one I(1). The Johansen cointegration 
results indicate existence of long run equilibrium relationships between the variables. ECM result was 
statistically significant with the correct sign. The speed of adjustment between the short run and long run 
behaviour of electricity supply variables was 59.73 percent. Institutional quality, with coefficient of -1.23 
indicates that institutional quality in the country does not contribute positively to electricity supply growth. 
Following the above results, the study concludes that institutional quality impacts negatively on electricity 
supply and therefore inhibit electricity supply growth in Nigeria. The study recommends that to enhance 
institutional quality and therefore boost electricity supply in Nigeria, policies should be directed at enhancing 
institutional quality such as policies to encourage contract enforcements, enhance property rights, reduce 
corruption, enthrone good governance, and improve the legal and security systems.  
Keywords: Institutional quality, electricity supply, energy, growth, power sector 
 
1. Introduction  
Sufficient electricity generation, transmission and distribution promote industrial operations and thus engender 
growth in all sectors of an economy (Ubi & Effiom, 2013; Ayodele, 2001). With adequate electricity supply, the 
people will be empowered to work at home and the micro, small and medium scale industries, and as well be 
engaged in large-scale industrial undertakings. 
Electricity is generated from primary sources of energy such as solar, water, waves, wind, oil, gas, coal, 
tide, etc. Nigeria is well blessed with all these sources of energy. The country’s annual average daily sunshine is 
6.25 hours, solar radiation is averaged at about 5.25 kw/m2/day and the country receives about 4.851x1012 
kilowatts (kw) of energy every day from the sun (Solar Energy International, 2011; Odetunde, 2008). As at the 
year 2013, Nigeria had a proven crude petroleum oil reserve of about 37.2 billion barrels and proven natural gas 
reserve estimate of 182 trillion cubic feet. Its coal reserve is estimated at 2 billion metric tonnes (UEIA, 2013; 
Sambo, Garba, Zarma & Gaji, 2010). There is abundance of water, tidal waves and wind. 
Despite the abundance of electricity production sources in the country, CIA (2014) report shows that 
Nigeria’s net electricity generation per capita rates is one of the lowest from the global perspective. Her daily 
kilo watt per hour (kw/h) per capita of electricity generation for 2009 was 0.39 compared to Pakistan’s 1.43 kw/h, 
Egypt’s 4.29 kw/h, Brazil’s 6.95 kw/h or China’s 7.04 kw/h. Electricity distribution network and voltage profiles 
for the country are very poor resulting to more than 50 percent of the populace living without electricity supply 
(Osueke & Ezugwu, 2011). Electricity production and distribution systems are weak and susceptible to major 
setbacks.  
The weak and inefficient system results from old and decaying infrastructure. Some of the electricity 
generation stations were built in the 1970s and are still being operated without major rehabilitation or upgrade. 
They are also poorly maintained. Also, until recently electricity generation, production and distribution has been 
inefficiently and poorly managed under the monopoly of a government agency, the National Electric Power 
Authority which later became known as Power Holding Company of Nigeria (Oyedepo, 2012). 
Inadequate facilities and hence inefficiency in generating and supplying adequate electricity in the 
midst of increasing population, new technologies, vast geographical landscape and an increasing business 
environment, creates electricity supply problems. This supply inadequacy has damaging consequential effects on 
every sector of the Nigerian economy. This situation discourages enterprise; increases cost of business; leads to 
high prices; encourages unemployment and elevates poverty. This has caused Nigeria’s businesses to lose huge 
financial resources that would have been used to promote industrial production.  
As noted earlier, electricity production and distribution in Nigeria has been an exclusive preserve of a 
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government agency. Energy policy formulations and pattern/level of implementations are highly related to 
governance structure. In addition, electricity supply infrastructures and maintenance are affected by institutional 
quality in the country. These show that institutions may affect electricity supply.  
North (1990) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human exchange, whether political, social or economic”. They also facilitate co-ordination 
and govern relationships between individuals and groups. Institutions play dominant roles in energy supply, 
while some institutions may encourage efficient energy supply, others may not (Kherallah & Kristen, 2001). 
According to Ojeaga, Odejimi, George and Azuh (2014), poor governance and weak institutions make policies, 
including energy policies, to be ineffective.  
Institutional qualities include: governance, contract enforcement, corruption, property rights, legal and 
security system, etc. Institutional qualities in Nigeria are weak, for instance in West Africa, Nigeria is rated 13th 
out of 16 countries and in Africa she occupies 41st position out of 54 countries as regards good governance. 
Democratic processes have been interjected with autocratic military incursions during which most aspects of the 
constitution are changed or suppressed, and laws enacted overnight with retroactive effects. Corruption index is 
also very high. These create uncertainties which are inimical to investments and property rights (Oromareghake, 
2013). On security, Boko Haram in the North East, cattle rustling in the North Central, Fulani herdsmen’s 
wanton destruction of lives and properties in the Middle Belt and the East, oil pipe blow ups by militant groups 
in the South South, kidnapping and politically motivated killings in the West, electricity infrastructure vandalism, 
protests against oil price hikes, armed robberies and cultist activities in schools and streets and other vices are all 
security issues working against economic, social, financial and political progress of Nigeria. All these and many 
more may help to define energy supply status of the country.  
This study is an imperative for studying and determining the relationship existing between institutional 
quality and electricity supply in Nigeria. 
 
1.1 Institutional quality organs in Nigeria 
i) Legal institutions: according to Soludo (2006), the supreme legal institution “is the constitution which is 
supplemented by the other enactments of the legislature and pronouncements of the courts. It spells out the 
economic relations embodied in property rights and rule of law”. In Nigeria, cases abound where alternative 
legal institutional infrastructures weakens economic development efforts (Soludo, 2006). In periods of 
military rules, frequent changes or suppression of some sections of the constitution created room for 
uncertainties. Reforms and legal infrastructures put in place in Nigeria to strengthen the legal institutions 
according to Soludo (2006) include establishment of: “judiciary reforms and sacking of many corrupt judges; 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC); Independent Corrupt Practices Commission 
(ICPC); the Energy Reform Bill; Anti-money laundering Act; Public Private Partnership in infrastructure 
provision; Pension Reform Act”. Others are: “Privatization Act; Public Procurement Bill; CBN/BOFIA Acts; 
Mining Reform Bill; Fiscal Responsibility Bill”; and Petroleum Industry Bill. All these are geared towards 
strengthening the Nigerian nation and its economic base. 
ii) Corruption: Akinpelu, Ogunseye, Bada and Agbeyangi (2013) laments that the highest index point Nigeria 
has attained in Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency International is 2.7 out of 10 points 
meaning that for the past 16 years, when the country has been appearing on the roll call, she has always been 
among the worst rated corrupt countries in the world. Ubi, Eko and Ndem, (2012) show that Nigeria recorded 
the highest corruption perception level in seven out of 8 corruption variables and has an index of 7.88, the 
highest among eight corrupt African nations. Transparency International Corruption Index of 2010 ranks 
Nigeria 134 out of 178 countries with 2.4 points, an increase from 130, 121, and 149 for 2009, 2008, and 
2007 years’ ranking respectively. The country is also ranked 22 ahead of other African countries 
(Transparency International, 2010). The more worrisome situation in Nigeria is expressed by Atelhe and 
Agada (2014), that corruption has developed a thick skin against all measures put in place to tackle it. For 
instance, those that are supposed to be at the forefront of the war against corruption are equally very corrupt. 
The battle against corruption has made Nigeria to evolve different programmes and policies, some for 
experimentation purposes. Such programmes and policies they assert include:  “the Judicial Commissions of 
Inquiry; Code of Conduct Bureau; the Public Complaints Commission; Mass Mobilization for Social Justice 
and Economic Recovery (MAMSER)”. Others are: “War Against Indiscipline and Corruption; the National 
Orientation Agency (NOA); Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC); the Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission (EFCC)”; etc. Despite all these, instead of corruption to abate, it blossoms.  
iii) Security: Security issue in Nigeria is of a major concern as threats of insecurity are almost becoming a way 
of life in the country. Insecurity and violence, reported Alubo (2011) in Ibrahim (2013), with accompanying 
negative consequences has engulf the whole country Nigeria like a thick black smoke choking life out of the 
people and their wealth and leaving behind as its trade mark agony, pains and misery. No section of the 
country is spared. Between 1999 and 2003, not less than 80 major violent eruptions were recorded. As at 
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2001, more than 6,000 people have been reportedly killed through violence. There are cases of armed 
robbery attacks on the Nigerian highways, financial institutions, business premises and private houses. Cases 
of insurgencies and militancy are recorded in the creeks of Niger Delta. Ethnic and religiously inclined crises 
and insurgencies are witnessed in the North Eastern states (Boko haram), Plateau, Oyo and other states of the 
country which has claimed lots of precious lives and billions of naira worth of wealth, houses and even 
communities. All these are indication of weak and incapable security system of our nation (Ibrahim, 2013). 
Different grades of electoral aggressiveness were reported during 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 elections and 
by-elections in some states of the country. Kidnapping has taken the centre stage in most parts of the country 
and people kidnapped are released after huge amounts has changed hands in form of ransom and those that 
could not withstand the harrowing experience or pay ransom get killed. There are cases of torture, brutality 
and extra judicial killings in disguise as investigation and accidental discharge by the police who are 
employed and paid to save lives and properties as reported by Human Rights Report 2010. These are also 
indicators of the sorry state of security situation in the country Nigeria. 
iv) Governance and political institutions: before colonial administration of Nigeria, the country was made up of 
kingdoms, small nations and ethnic entities. Traditional governance institutions held sway in all these 
societies and these institutions were very similar in many respects (Roberts, 2004). These traditional 
governance institutions were the custodians of their citizen’s norms, traditions, cultures and many other 
practices. Though their powers have been reduced now, they are still a force to reckon with, as they are still 
found in all the sections of the country till date. They symbolise indigenous people’s traditions, customs, 
laws, rights, privileges, and laws which include Paramount Rulers and their Councils, Chiefs, Elders, and title 
holders. The appointments of these categories of leaders were based on their personalities, contributions and 
probably their economic powers. Considerations were also given to issues such as contributions to the 
security, growth and development of their communities. These traditional institutions possessed some 
executive, legislative as well as judicial powers. With the world wide spread of democracy, Nigeria adopted 
democratic form of governance through the instrumentality of both internal and external pressures exerted on 
the country with the hope that democratic governance will stimulate development (Omotola, 2007; 
Somolakae, 2007; Jamo, 2013). The last election Nigeria had within the control of their British colonial 
rulers took place in the last months of 1959, this election led the nation to independence in 1960. After then, 
the first post colonial elections held in the last months of the year 1964 ended in crisis. About November of 
1965, elections conducted into Western state house of assembly landed the country into another stream of 
election related crisis. Due to continued crisis, the military on January 15, 1966 took over government 
plunging the country into more killings and wanton destruction of properties. Elections of 1979 was 
conducted with intentions to kick the military out of Nigeria’s political scenery they unconstitutionally 
wandered into, however the outcome of that election did not go down well with some parties who challenged 
the election results in court. In 1983 general elections, the ruling party, NPN, was returned to power amidst 
complains of rigging. In December of 1983, the military junta once again ceased power. Another election on 
June 12, 1993 was dogged by controversy and the military continued in reign until 1999 when a general 
election was conducted. However the 1999 election was reportedly rigged like the previous elections in 
Nigeria. From 1999, democracy seems to have returned to stay in Nigeria, subsequent elections were held in 
2003, 2007, 2011 (Oromareghake, 2013), and 2015. None of these elections can however be celebrated to be 
free, fair, participatory, competitive, legitimate, neutral, or impartial, as are required of good democratic 
elections. 
 
2 Literature review 
The  electricity  environment, as  highlighted by  Dramani and  Tewari (2014)  is influenced  by  such factors as 
historical, economic, political and physical conditions  of  the  country  while  the  institutional  structure  is 
determined by factors such as electricity related laws, policies and organisational elements. Electricity 
institutional structure is divided into electricity law, electricity policy, governance and management. These 
institutional parts are divided further to underscore a few of the very relevant institutional portions. Institutional 
structure is defined by political and economic qualities, they can influence effective functioning of the electricity 
sector since they are capable of promoting effective and efficient transformation of the sector. This indicates a 
kind of relationship between effective electricity sector and high quality institutions in a country. Empirical 
literatures from scholars are available that discusses such relationships in varied ways, these are considered in 
this section. 
In a study for Ghana, Dramani and Tewari (2014) examined institutions and electricity sector’s 
performance from 1990 to 2010 using descriptive statistics, ordinary least square (OLS) and error component 
model (EC). The study utilized three procedures of: institutional effects on the performance indicators of the 
electricity sector; the role of regulatory institutions on the rate of return applying yardstick competition; and 
measuring the efficiency levels of the distribution segment using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). They 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.14, 2016 
 
47 
revealed that institutions influence the reserve margin, installed capacity, and peak demand positively and 
possess the potential of reversing the negative trends of global reliability indices such as system average 
interruption duration index (SAIDI), etc. Thus, institutions should be considered an important tool in addressing 
Ghana’s electricity problems, as in any other economy. 
Yu (2010) concentrated on legislative processes and institutions as key ingredients of China’s energy 
advancement. The study shows that to grasp the import and make progress towards better China’s energy 
situations, as in any other country, a thorough evaluation of energy laws/legislation as well as its institutions is 
very necessary. They concluded, among others, that inability to have a single energy administrative system for 
the country and lack of an effective energy institution for the country can pose significant institutional setbacks 
to energy sector advancements.  They then recommended, among others, the enhancement of institutional 
development. 
Golden and Min (2012) examined political institution’s effects on electricity supply. Power 
Corporation of Uttar Pradesh in India was used as source of data for the study. Their objective was to: study the 
politics of electricity theft between 2000 and 2009; and determine if elections, political parties, and criminal 
status of state legislatures affect power theft. The study adopted descriptive analysis and ordinary least square 
(OLS) and showed that electricity theft changes with the electoral cycle. Years legislative elections are held will 
record significantly high electricity theft than years of no election. This indicates that political institutions can be 
used to encourage or discourage power theft in a society and hence promote electricity supply to citizens. 
Though the study failed to show whether electric power theft can be linked to political criminality or weak 
institutions, it has nonetheless established a link between electricity supply problem (power theft) and political 
institutions available in a particular state.  
On policies and institution building, García (2010) carried out a study on best policies and institutions 
for renewable electricity supply using China as a case, where policies and institutions were partially and 
imperfectly related to best practices. The study showed that “best practice” is a function of policies that can 
facilitate private investment through perfection of market mechanism; as well as the establishment of liberal-
market institutions (good governance, corporate competition, and enhanced information), which would also 
facilitate investment. Also, that there is need for institutions to display governance, i.e. legal security, capable 
bureaucracy and predictability of regulations and openness to competition and foreign participation. Policies 
here is defined as “those rules set by public authorities as the preferred course of action toward a desired 
outcome, and institutions as the structure of economic actors (governmental and corporate) and the mechanism 
that influences these actors and relations between them”. 
Olarinde and Omojolaibi (2014), based on endogenous growth model studied the long run and short 
run relationship between institutional quality, electricity consumption and the rate of growth of Nigeria’s 
economy between 1980 and 2011. The study applied the ARDL test and VECM based test technique to show 
whether there is a short run and long run relationship between the model’s variables. Findings showed that there 
exist a short run as well as long run relationship between economic growth, energy consumption and institution 
in the country. The long run estimated elasticity coefficient of electricity consumption was positively significant 
and less than unity, and as well significantly impacts institutions. These imply that electricity consumption and 
institutions are essential for Nigeria’s growth process. The application of the ECM-based Granger causality test 
was found to be consistent with the ARDL test, the result indicated that institutions, electricity consumption, 
labour force, oil prices and gross capital formation did Granger caused growth. This means that there exists a bi-
directional Granger causal relationship between institutional quality and electricity consumption in both the long 
and short-run periods. From this study we can see that Nigeria needs uninterrupted power supply to help close 
the wide gap between electricity demand and supply. It should be noted that if this gap is closed, energy demand 
will be high because consistent supply will trigger economic activities, encourage entrepreneurship, propel 
industry and enhance economic growth in Nigeria.   
A similar study by Bouoiyour, Selmi and Shahbaz (2014) was undertaken for Algeria as a rentier state 
between 1971 and 2012. The study adopted ARDL bound test. They also employed the innovative accounting 
approach. They assessed the “relationship between electricity consumption and institutions in a rentier state by 
integrating variables such as: economic growth, urbanisation, trade openness and foreign direct investment”. The 
study found that “institutions play an important role in explaining the co-integration among the variables in the 
long run”. This indicates that weak governance structure may affect electricity consumption directly or indirectly 
through urbanisation and foreign direct investment. With considerable amount of income, government will be 
enabled to cut down some tax burdens and domestic spending, all leading to weakened institutions (Aslaksen, 
2011). 
The studies reviewed above indicate that there exist some relationships between electricity supply and 
institutional factors. These relationships are such that where there are weak and inefficient institutional qualities, 
electricity supply will be affected negatively and otherwise where there are strong and efficient institutional 
quality. As adduced by North (1990), institutions matter. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
The Solow-Swan model is anchored on the neoclassical aggregate production function which expresses the 
relationship of aggregate output of a particular economy with total: available labour in the same economy; 
human capital in the economy as well as physical capital in the economy, in addition to some measures of 
intensity of technology available in such an economy. Solow-Swan model profess that the only way long-run 
growth can be maintained is through increase in total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is assumed to be exogenous 
with the ability to keep increasing indefinitely. But increase in TFP mainly result from technological 
improvements which includes anything that the conventional factors of production exclude and comes from a 
number of sources, including electricity supply (energy) and institutional quality (Vlahinić-Dizdarević & Žiković, 
2010). 
Institutional quality affects energy supply and demand either positively or negatively. Weak 
institutional quality, negative norms, behaviours and cultures, poor infrastructural facilities, governance and 
policies, as well as poor communication, information and energy services, non conducive economic and financial 
institutions all negatively affect energy. Where these institutional qualities are in the opposite realms and states, 
energy supply will be encouraged (Ojeaga, Odejimi, Goerge & Azuh, 2014; Nytorv, 2013; Shove, 2003). 
Thus, based on the Solow-Swan neo classical growth framework which forms the theoretical 
background for this research, the model specified for this work shall be in the form developed by Arrow (1962) 
and simplified in a Cobb-Douglas production function format as:  
Qt = AKtα,Lt1-α  - -  (1) 
Where: Qt = Outputs at time t; Lt = Labour Stock at time t; Kt = Capital at time t; A and K = Total 
Factor Productivity; A = Efficiency Parameter; α and α-1 = coefficient parameters. 
Technology is the efficiency parameter and thus the factor which can be logically connected to energy. 
It is energy that powers any kind of technology. However, energy production process requires huge amounts of 
capital investments.  These investments are associated and influenced by the quality of institutions available in a 
particular economic environment. Thus following Stern and Cutler (2004), Dramani and Tewari (2014), Olarinde 
and Omojolaibi (2014), and others, it can thus be assumed that the efficiency parameter (A) is a function of 
electricity supply, institutional quality, and other exogenous factors (C), i.e.  
A = f(ELS, INSTQ, C)  - - (2)  
Where: ELS = Electricity Supply growth ; INSTQ = Institutional Quality; and C = Exogenous factors 
 
4 Model specification 
This study covers the period from 1981 to 2015. Econometric approach for the study relies on time series data 
regression. The data for the study were sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletins and annual 
reports, Ministry of Power, National Electricity Regulation Commission, and World Bank.  
Given the production function: Qt = AKtα,Lt1-α and that A = f(ELS, INSTQ, C). By endogenising 
electricity supply (ELS) and institutional quality (INSTQ), we can form our explicit estimation functions for 
electricity supply growth. From studies by Bouoiyour, Selmi and Shahbaz (2014), Dramani and Tewari (2014), 
Ubi, Effiom, Okon and Oduneka (2012), etc. the various factors of electricity supply and demand can be 
categorized as: annual rainfall, per capita GDP, electricity prices, government investment (funding) in power 
sector, state of technology, etc. 
Therefore making electric supply growth our dependent variable we have: 
ELS = f(PCGDP, ELP, TECH, INSTQ, ELCON, RAIN, GOVINV, DUM)      - - (3) 
Where: ELS = Electricity Supply in mega watt 
PCGDP = Per capita gross domestic product measured in millions of Naira 
ELP = Electricity prices in Naira of mega watt of electricity per hour (N/mw/hr) 
TECH = Technology (time variance, one year is taken as one data point) 
INSTQ = Institutional quality measured in contract intensive money (CIM)  
ELCON = Industrial electricity consumption in megawatt of electricity per hour 
RAIN = Rainfall measured in millimetres (mm) of rainfall per year 
GOVINV = Government investment (expenditure) in the power sector in millions of Naira 
DUM = Electricity market structure reforms ((zero and one for periods before (1980 to 2004) and after 
(2005 to 2015)) reformation in the power sector respectively. 
For the regression function to be in an estimation form, equation (3) is reformulated to include the stochastic 
error term:  
ELS = b0 + b1PGDP + b2ELP + b3TECH + b4INSTQ + b5ELCON + b6RAIN + b7GOVINV + b8DUM + v -       
- 4) 
Where: v = Stochastic Error Term. Other variables are as earlier defined; b1 to b7 are the parameter estimates 
measuring the impact of the explanatory variables. Aprior expected parameter values are: 0 < b1 to b8  
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5 Empirical results 
Table 1. Correlation matrix  
 ELS PGDP GOVINV ELP ELCON INSTQ RAIN TECH DUM 
ELS 1.0000 0.9587 0.6457 0.9296 0.9253 0.7328 0.5362 0.8672 0.8330 
PGDP 0.9587 1.0000 0.9183 0.8907 0.8498 0.7615 0.4160 0.7830 0.8338 
GOVINV 0.6457 0.9183 1.0000 0.7872 0.7302 0.6338 0.2958 0.6220 0.6655 
ELP 0.9296 0.8907 0.7872 1.0000 0.6533 0.5689 0.7681 0.9357 0.7529 
ELCON 0.9253 0.8498 0.7302 0.6533 1.0000 0.7309 0.5203 0.8385 0.8092 
INSTQ 0.7328 0.7615 0.6338 0.5689 0.7309 1.0000 0.0693 0.5669 0.8357 
RAIN 0.5362 0.4160 0.2958 0.7681 0.5203 0.0693 1.0000 0.7992 0.3995 
TECH 0.8672 0.7830 0.6220 0.9357 0.8385 0.5669 0.7992 1.0000 0.9573 
DUM 0.8330 0.8338 0.6655 0.7529 0.8092 0.8357 0.39957 0.9573 1.0000 
Source: Computed by the Author (2016) 
As shown in Table 1, correlation analysis undertaken indicates that all the regressors in the electricity 
supply equation were found to possess positive relationships with electricity supply. These imply that changes in 
each of these variables positively impact on the other variables in the model. This also guided us in dropping 
some variables in the model that were strongly correlated in order to avoid multicolinearity. 
Table 2. Results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests 
Variables  Level  1st Difference Remarks  
GOVINV  0.493694 -4.603638*** I(1) 
ELCON -0.962527 -8.148139*** I(1) 
ELP  1.181042 -5.412346*** I(1) 
INSTQ -0.679324 -6.391510*** I(1) 
PCGDP  2.692490 -7.514412*** I(1) 
RAIN -1.551040 -5.836048*** I(1) 
ELS  0.720391  -7.857469*** I(1) 
Source: Computed by the Author (2016) 
Note: Test critical values (Constant): 10% = -2.6148; 5% level = -2.9527; 1% level = -3.6422 
*** signify significance at one percent 













Source: Computed by the Author (2016) 
Results of the unit root tests using the augmented Dickey-Fuller technique indicate that all the 
variables in the equation were stationary at first difference and are therefore integrated of order one I(1). Test for 
Granger causality results shown in table 3 indicate that there is uni-directional Granger causal relationship 
between electricity consumption and electricity supply; that there exists bi-directional causal relationship 
between government investments in the power sector and electricity supply in Nigeria; and rainfall have a 
unidirectional causal relationship with electricity supply, the direction of causality running from rainfall to 
electricity supply. However, institutional quality and electricity supply are independent of each of other. So also 
is electricity prices and electricity supply.  
 
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 ELCON does not Granger cause ELS 33 6.30246 0.0055 
 ELS does not Granger cause ELCON 2.78896 0.0786 
 GOVINV does not Granger cause ELS 33 7.99279 0.0018 
 ELS does not Granger cause GOVINV 3.50132 0.0439 
 RAIN does not Granger cause ELS 33 6.66132 0.0004 
 ELS does not Granger cause RAIN 0.12474 0.8832 
 ELP does not Granger Cause ELS             33 0.96615 0.3929 
   ELS does not Granger Cause ELP  3.20564 0.05q90 
 
3.20564 0.05q90 
 INSTQ does not Granger Cause ELS        33 0.46977 0.6300 
 ELS does not Granger Cause INSTQ 0.89424 0.4203 
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Table 4. Cointegration resutls 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue statistic Critical value Prob.** 
None *  0.993593  555.9773  219.4016  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.962501  389.3158  179.5098  0.0000 
At most 2 *  0.950886  280.9624  143.6691  0.0000 
At most 3 *  0.896882  181.5131  111.7805  0.0000 
At most 4 *  0.766678  106.5410  83.93712  0.0005 
At most 5  0.463444  58.51488  60.06141  0.0671 
At most 6  0.407584  37.96962  40.17493  0.0819 
Source: Computed by the Author (2016) 
Note: * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 0.05 level; Trace test indicates five cointegrating 
equations at 0.05 level; **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
Table 5. Lag order selection criteria  
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -1197.727 NA   3.05e+26  75.17046  75.39948  75.24637 
1 -1073.391   202.0466*   6.27e+23*   68.96193*   70.33606*   69.41742* 
2 -1053.591  25.98750  9.82e+23  69.28693  71.80616  70.12199 
3 -1024.473  29.11831  1.07e+24  69.02954  72.69388  70.24416 
Source: Computed by the Author (2016) 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test 
at 5% level); AIC: Akaike information criterion; FPE: Final prediction error; HQ: Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion; SC: Schwarz information criterion 
The Johansen cointegration results as shown in table 4 indicate at most five cointegrating equations at 
five percent level of significance. This shows that there exist unique long run equilibrium relationships between 
the variables in the equation. To determine the lag structure, the lag length selection for the error correction 
model (ECM) was determined using: Final Prediction Error (FPE); Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); 
Schwarze Information Criterion (SC); and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ), table 5 shows that the 
optimal lag length for the model is one (1). 
Table 6. Parsimonious ECM results  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
D(ELS(-1)) 0.821361 0.186352 4.407569 0.0002 
D(ELP(-1)) 2.145576 0.538785 3.982242 0.0005 
D(ELCON) 7.372453 1.642663 4.488112 0.0001 
D(ELCON(-1)) -8.707843 2.641711 -3.296289 0.0029 
D(INSTQ) -1.230940 5.711944 -2.155028 0.0410 
D(GOVEXP) 4.993240 2.433210 2.052120 0.0501 
D(RAIN(-1)) 33.68354 7.806026 4.315068 0.0002 
DUM(-1) 1.559726 1.025153 1.521458 0.1407 
ECM(-1) -0.597316 0.143989 -4.148335 0.0004 
C 39010.95 9016.105 4.326807 0.0002 
R-squared 0.791060     Mean dependent var 1446.419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.768199     S.D. dependent var 887.6396 
S.E. of regression 96.42587 Akaike info criterion 12.19735 
Sum squared resid 232448.7     Schwarz criterion 12.60139 
Log likelihood -198.3550     F-statistic 346.4257 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.922756 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 Source: Computed by the Author (2016) 
ECM in this study follows the general-to-specific method where the overparametized ECM are 
estimated at first and then followed by the parsimonious ECM derived from the former. From the pair-wise 
correlational statistics shown in table 1, the ELS equation variables: PCGDP and GOVINV; TECH and ELP; 
ELS and ELCON were highly correlated among themselves at over 90 percent levels. To avoid the problem of 
multicollinearity, decrease the numbers of explanatory variables and therefore increase the degrees of freedom in 
the regression analysis, PCGDP and TECH were eliminated from the model. 
In order to examine the impact of institutional quality on electricity supply in Nigeria, institutional 
quality (INSTQ) was regressed on aggregate electricity supply. Electricity price (ELP), electricity consumption 
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(ELCON) government investment in the power sector (GOVINV), aggregate volume of rainfall (RAIN), and 
structural changes in the power sector (DUM) were also added as major determinants of electricity supply. The 
parsimonious ECM result shown in table 6 reveals that the error correction coefficient, which indicates the speed 
with which the dynamic model restores back to equilibrium when it deviates and the speed with which variables 
would return to equilibrium was (-0.5973) negative and significant with t-statistics of -4.148. This suggests that a 
long term equilibrium relationships exist between electricity supply and all the variables that influenced its short-
run equilibrium which are captured in the equation. As revealed, the speed of adjustment of 59.73 percent 
between the short-term and the long-term behaviours of electricity supply with its independent variables was 
relatively high. This implies that adjustment is covered up within one year. The significance of the coefficient of 
ECM flows along with the submission made before that these variables are actually cointegrated. 
The value of adjusted R2 which is 0.76.82 means that about 77 percent of total changes in electricity 
supply are determined through variations in the independent variables. This shows a good fit for the equation. 
The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.92 (approximately 2.0) indicate the absence of serial correlation in the 
equation, as such, the equation is good for policy analysis. 
The result of the analysis shows that institutional quality (INSTQ) coefficient has negative sign (-1.23) 
This shows that institutional quality impacts negatively on electricity supply in Nigeria and affirm that 
institutional quality in the country is weak and inefficient. This result indicates that a one percent increase in 
institutional quality leads to a 1.23 percent decrease in megawatts of electricity supply in the country. 
Electricity price (ELP), electricity consumption (ELCON), government investment in the power sector 
(GOVINV), and annual rainfall (RAIN) all have positive coefficients and are statistically significant. These are 
in line with the apriori expectations of this study and economic prescriptions. This goes in tandem with Ubi, 
Effiom, Okon and Oduneka (2012) that these variables are among the major factors that determine the 
megawatts of electricity supplied in Nigeria, although their study showed that “electricity price does not have 
reliable influence on electricity supply in Nigeria”. The result here implies that increases in these variables will 
translate to increased electricity supply.  
 
6. Discussion of results  
The results showed that institutional quality impacts positively on electricity supply in Nigeria. This result is in 
consonance with those of Dramani and Tewari (2014) and Golden and Min (2012) who differently established 
some links between institutional quality and electricity supply in Ghana and India respectively. Though these 
studies show some positive relationship between institutional quality and electricity supply in those countries, 
the case is different for Nigeria. This result confirms that institutional quality in Nigeria is weak and inefficient 
and that institutional quality impact negatively and inhibit progress of electricity supply in the country. As 
indicated by Yu (2010) “to better understand and improve energy development, a comprehensive examination 
and improvement of a country’s institutional quality is essential”. This is because where institutional quality is 
ineffective and inefficient, it will reflect in inefficient and ineffective power supply and ultimately on the 
economy as a whole. Emovon, Kareem and Adeyeri (2010) argue that a steady and reliable electric power supply 
is a major factor of economic growth and development. They reveal that with total grid capacity of about 8,876 
megawatts for Nigeria only about 3,653 megawatts were available for supplies by December of year 2009. An 
indication that actual electricity power supplied is less than 41 percent of total installed power capacity in 
Nigeria. This lacuna they reasoned was caused mostly by institutional factors, such as: corruption; poor 
maintenance management (governance), inadequate funding, among others. Though the needed power 
generation resources are in abundance in the country, and that Nigeria is supplying uninterrupted electricity to 
countries such as Togo, Benin Republic and Niger Republic, those institutional factors play down on power 
generation and hence distancing the gap between domestic electricity supply and demand in the country. From 
this study’s findings, it is indicative that to improve electricity supply in Nigeria, institutional qualities should be 
made to be effective and efficient. 
 
7. Conclusion  
The findings of this research study show that institutional quality in Nigeria impact negatively on electricity 
supply growth. On the basis of this finding, it is concluded that if institutional quality is improved and made to 
be effective, electricity supply will be enhanced, this will in turn promote growth in the country. Improved 
institutional quality is therefore a factor for achieving electricity supply growth in Nigeria. Also, electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution should be effectively and efficiently provided to further improve the 
country’s institutional quality. 
 
8. Recommendations  
To enhance institutional quality and therefore boost electricity supply growth, the nation’s laws and contract 
enforcement mechanisms should be overhauled and strengthened. Thus, there is need to build up policies that 
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will enhance institutional quality such as development of policies that will encourage contract enforcements, 
enhance property rights, fight corruption genuinely, enthrone good and effective governance and political 
institutions, restructure and genuinely improve the legal and security systems and refurbish the educational 
system among others. 
Considering the fact that electricity, if adequately supplied can drive the wheels of industrialization, 
and its interaction with institutional quality can boost economic growth, policies should be directed to more 
power generation, transmission and distribution in the country.  
The results indicate that proper funding of the power sector will enhance electricity production 
positively. Policy should be directed at providing funds at a cheaper cost to investors in the power sector. These 
funds will enhance the purchase and replacement of old and worn out transformers and other equipments that 
will boost electricity supply in the country. 
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